I think this can be a good reminder to someone going the Military control way of the statecraft, that soon after the climax, it invariably is an unfathomable chasm of regret.
Air Marshal Asghar Khan former CAS (23 July 1957 – 22 July 1965), known for writing a letter to General Zia ul Haq to take over the country’s affairs from the then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, writes in his book ‘We Have Learnt Nothing from History’:
The second time when I had the opportunity to meet Mr Jinnah and to hear his views on an important subject was on 14 August 1947 in Karachi. As the Governor-General of Pakistan, he had given a large reception on the lawns of the Governor-General’s House, now the Governor’s House, in Karachi. I was among the dozen or so officers of the armed forces invited and one of the others was Lt Colonel (later Major-General) Akbar Khan of ‘Rawalpindi Conspiracy’ fame. Akbar Khan suggested that we should talk with the Quaid-i-Azam. The Quaid was moving around meeting his guests and when he came near us he asked us how we were. Akbar Khan replied that we were very happy that he had succeeded in creating a free and independent country and we had hoped that under his leadership our genius will be allowed to flower’. He went on to say that we were, however, disappointed that higher posts in the armed forces had been given to British officer who still controlled our destiny. The Quaid who had been listening patiently raised his finger and said, Never forget that you are the servants of the state. You do not make policy. It is we, the people’s representatives, who decide how the country is to be run. Your job is only to obey the decisions of your civilian masters.
Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan, former COAS (20 December 1970 – 2 March 1972), in his Memoirs writes:
In an army, effective leadership at the top makes all the difference between success and failure: so it is with the Pakistan Army. Our environment went askew because Martial Law became a part and parcel of our very existence, thereby burdening the army with the dual tasks of administering the country and defending it in any emergency. I shall frankly state that we failed miserably in both these undertakings. Our commitment to Martial Law was total in 1971, when in spite of the fact that the Army was all-in-all, there was no communication whatsoever between the Government and the General Headquarters. The void was absolute, and it had to be experienced to be believed.
As far as I can foresee, the spectre of Martial Law will be ever-present in Pakistan, unless she produces political leaders who can look beyond provincial horizons, be above-board possess honesty of purpose, command the solid support of the masses, and be genuinely concerned with their welfare and, last but by no means least, be patriots. (The meaning of the last word is a person who loves, supports, and defends his country and its interests.) This would be a tall order for our political community to fulfill, and it will be equally wishful to console ourselves that one fine day the leadership of the Army may decide to devote themselves wholly to their profession. I am not for one moment bracketing the junior officers with the top ranks. In both the wars with India their performance was magnificent, especially those who were in East Pakistan in 1971. In spite of being utterly isolated from the West Wing, harassed by a not-too-friendly population and surrounded by an implacable neighbour, they stood up to the unremitting strain for over six months with a courage and resolve that is not easy to find in the pages of military history. They were let down by their Government and General Head-quarters and their own senior-most commanders.
General K. M. Arif Vice COAS (1984-1987), in Khaki Shadows has this to say:
The Yahya interregnum, traumatic and turbulent, witnessed Pakistan’s defeat in war and the amputation of its Eastem wing. This monumental tragedy has remained an unexplained affair and the truth has still not emerged regarding Pakistan’s disintegration and military surrender. This would expose the political and military blunders made since 1947, a risk not acceptable to the policy makers. The details of the 1971 war have been written by the winning side in which facts have been falsified, with bias injected in the narration rather generously.
The history of failure in war can be summed up in two words: Too late. Pakistan lagged behind events in East Pakistan, lost the initiative, chased shadows and met her doom. Under the inspiring leadership of Sir Winston Churchill, Great Britain had converted the defeat at Dunkirk into victory. Conversely, Pakistan, reeling under the impact of defeat and the stigma of surrender in 1971, naively consigned its political, diplomatic and military skeletons to the safety closets and marked them TOP SECRET.
Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani former DG ISI (1990 – 1991), in Pakistan Adrift says:
By a strange coincidence, I was again in Kohat (on my way to Bannu where I was posted), when in March 1969 Yahya Khan imposed martial law. Something didn’t seem quite right, but it gave me my first taste, or illusion, of power over civilians. For the next few months, I was heading a summary military court and taking to task anyone carrying an unlicensed weapon—the Army’s pet procedure to restore law and order in the country. The problem was that in the two districts under my jurisdiction, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, this covered almost everyone. Of course, only those who were on the wrong side of the law (or its enforcers) were charged and produced before me. I don’t think it did much good for law or order, but it did help the civil administration to show khaki rule in a bad light. That the Army lets itself be duped every time it assumes political power, I was to learn much later. That, as a cog in the military machine, one was contributing to such a design became a pretty discomforting thought.
He also says:
The Army’s takeover of political power, whatever else it may have done to the country, never did any good to the service … After the putsch of 1999, [Musharraf] had all the country’s resources at his disposal, but since he mainly trusted the military, he planted members of the armed forces in many important civil institutions, and thus undid most of the good work done in the previous years to cleanse the armed forces of the unmilitary traits… When serving generals started falling for prime land offered at bargain prices and their palatial houses were built by government contractors, one knew that the fish was now rotting from its head.
Fiqh ud deen 